

# DEFEND & DELIVER

## DMARC

Email authentication for  
better email security



### ONLINE BOOTCAMP

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# Bootcamp Plan and Upcoming Webinars

# Bootcamp Overview

**Must attend live sessions for certificate (1 per week)**

- **Week One: Getting Started**
  - **May 5th:** Webinar - BEC and DMARC in a Nutshell
- **Weeks Two and Three: Time to Implement!!**
  - **May 12:** What are SPF and DKIM?
  - DMARC in Detail and Online Technical Demos (**only need to attend one of the three**).
    - **Tuesday, May 18<sup>th</sup>** - demo of Window DNS
    - **Wednesday, May 19<sup>th</sup>** - demo Linux DNS
    - **Thursday, May 20<sup>th</sup>** - demo of Cloud DNS
- **Week Four: Ongoing Management**
  - **May 26<sup>th</sup>:** DMARC Reporting & Analysis: What Happens Next
- **Week Five: Wrap-up Session**
  - **June 2<sup>nd</sup>:** Bootcamp Review and Additional Protocols

# Phishing



# Phishing

## Phishing Attack!



# PHISHING



- Could lead to
  - Ransomware or other malware
  - Fraud (false wire transfer requests)
  - Theft of PII
- Why is it successful?
  - Difficulty in determining if message came from legitimate source
  - From\Sender address is spoofed



# Business Email Compromise (BEC) in \$\$\$

City - \$1.04 million  
City - \$1.73 million  
City - \$800K  
Religious  
Institution - \$1.75  
million

(source:  
bleepingcomputer.com)

## FBI 2020 Internet Crime Report



Crime Type	Loss	Crime Type	Victims
BEC/EAC	\$1,866,642,107	Phishing/Vishing/Smishing/Pharming	241,342
Confidence Fraud/Romance	\$600,249,821	Non-Payment/Non-Delivery	108,869
Investment	\$336,469,000	Extortion	76,741
Non-Payment/Non-Delivery	\$265,011,249	Personal Data Breach	45,330
Identity Theft	\$219,484,699	Identity Theft	43,330
Spoofing	\$216,513,728	Spoofing	28,218
Real Estate/Rental	\$213,196,082	Misrepresentation	24,276
Personal Data Breach	\$194,473,055	Confidence Fraud/Romance	23,751
Tech Support	\$146,477,709	Harassment/Threats of Violence	20,604
Credit Card Fraud	\$129,820,792	BEC/EAC	19,369
Corporate Data Breach	\$128,916,648	Credit Card Fraud	17,614
Government Impersonation	\$109,938,030	Employment	16,879
Other	\$101,523,082	Tech Support	15,421
Advanced Fee	\$83,215,405	Real Estate/Rental	13,638
Extortion	\$70,935,939	Advanced Fee	13,020
Employment	\$62,314,015	Government Impersonation	12,827
Lottery/Sweepstakes/Inheritance	\$61,111,319	Overpayment	10,988
Phishing/Vishing/Smishing/Pharming	\$54,241,075		



# Agari Cyber Intelligence Division (ACID)

## Threat Intel Brief: The Geography of BEC



Global locations of BEC threat actors.


<https://agari.com/insights/whitepapers/threat-intelligence-brief-geography-bec/>

# Types of Spoofing

- Display Name Spoofing - “**Company** <person@yahoo.com>”
- Lookalike Domain Spoofing - “Company <person@c0rnpany.com>”
- Domain Spoofing - “Company <person@company.com>”

# SOLUTION:

# DMARC



## A PROVEN WAY TO MITIGATE RISK

Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC)

It's like an identity check for your organization's domain name.

# What is **DMARC?**

A DMARC policy allows a sender to indicate that their messages are protected, and tells a receiver what to do if one of the authentication methods passes or fails – such as send the message or junk/reject the message.



**DMARC** prevents spammers or  
**phishers** from using valid organization  
names for email fraud



**DMARC** increases  
customer **confidence**  
**and trust**

**It protects**  
the integrity of  
**your brand**

# Additional Benefits of DMARC

- Inbox Protection on the Consumer side:
  - **DMARC Verification, not policy**
  - 80 percent of the current total number of worldwide email accounts (source: Valimail).
- Deliverability
- Visibility: Provides insight into attempts to spam, phish, or even spear-phish using your organization's brand/name

# Two Parts to DMARC

- **DMARC Policy**

- sending organization
- use existing DNS infrastructure

- **DMARC Verification**

- receiving organization
- enable on email security system
- checks all incoming messages for DMARC policy



# DMARC Myth ONE



It's **used on email domain only**

ANY domain can be impersonated and used in phishing attacks, so we need to do more than just securing only the domains used to send mail.

Every domain owned by your organization should be secured with its own DMARC policy.

**#GOTheDMARCWay**



# Authentication

DMARC implementation requires Sender Policy Framework (SPF) and DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) in order to work


- SPF is used to define which mail servers are authorized to send mail
- DKIM is used to add a digital signature for an additional layer to authenticate the sender

# DMARC Policy

## What happens to the messages?

- Depends on the policy setting:
  - **None** - reports possible suspicious mail messages, but all mail is sent to inbox
  - **Quarantine** - fail SPF/DKIM and alignment, message is sent to spam/junk folder
  - **Reject** - fail SPF/DKIM and alignment, message is dropped and not delivered at all
- Best practice is to start at 'None' and gradually move to 'Reject'

# Overview



# DMARC DNS TXT Record

- Basic:

Host: `_dmarc. <domainname>`

Value: `v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:<email address>;  
ruf=mailto:<email address>;`

- Complex:

Host: `_dmarc. <domainname>`

Value: `v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:<email address>;  
ruf=mailto:<email address>; fo=1; adkim=r; aspf=r; pct=100; rf=afrrf;  
ri=86400; sp=reject;`



# DMARC Reports

- DMARC generates two types of reports:
  - Aggregate
  - Forensic (or Failure)
- Reports will provide insight as to which messages were marked as suspicious
- Allows for IT staff to correct any issues with valid messages being dropped by the policy

# Sample Aggregate Report

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<feedback>
<report_metadata>
  <org_name>google.com</org_name>
  <email>noreply-dmarc-support@google.com</email>
  <extra_contact_info>https://support.google.com/a/answer/2466580</extra_contact_info>
  <report_id>6156901232184779430</report_id>
  <date_range>
    <begin>1466121600</begin>
    <end>1466207999</end>
  </date_range>
</report_metadata>
<policy_published>
  <domain>google.com</domain>
  <adkim>r</adkim>
  <aspf>r</aspf>
  <p>quarantine</p>
  <sp>quarantine</sp>
  <pct>100</pct>
</policy_published>
<record>
  <row>
    <source_ip>2607:f8b0:400</source_ip>
    <count>2</count>
    <policy_evaluated>
      <disposition>none</disposition>
      <dkim>pass</dkim>
      <spf>pass</spf>
    </policy_evaluated>
  </row>
  <identifiers>
    <header>From: [redacted]<[redacted]@google.com></header>
  </identifiers>
  <auth_results>
    <dkim>
      <domain>globalcyberalliance.org</domain>
      <result>pass</result>
    </dkim>
    <spf>
      <domain>globalcyberalliance.org</domain>
      <result>pass</result>
    </spf>
  </auth_results>
</record>
```

# Sample Forensic/Failure Report

```
Feedback-Type: auth-failure
User-Agent: szn-mime/2.0.41
Version: 1
Original-Rcpt-To: xxxx@seznam.cz
Source-IP: 198.2.183.22
✓ Authentication-Results: email.seznam.cz 1;
    spf_align=fail;
    dkim_align=fail
✓ Delivery-Result: delivered\r\n\r\nReceived: from mail22.suw13.rsgsv.net (mail22.suw13.rsgsv.net [198.2.183.22]
    by email-smtpd9.ng.seznam.cz (Seznam SMTPD 1.3.106) with ESMTTP;
    Fri, 12 Jul 2019 10:01:20 +0200 (CEST)
✓ DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=fbl.mcsv.net; s=k1;
    t=1562918478; bh=z+cM1nqHlHrjpgwrD2iSbq3xmFeT/V05Zoa5X0w5TY8=;
    h=Subject:From:Reply-To:To:Date:Message-ID:Feedback-ID:List-ID:
    List-Unsubscribe:Content-Type:MIME-Version;
    b=QhxQk+uH4sVDFSyWdTJrdFzJc3wTQ9TBBLq2FDnri+hfqMAMHaAfGVHytqUcnWL3x
    H6X0zZZkwp6KJc2vsm/CH1Xls10xaPWHG3ioK0aM5kv7BJfBX2PRAfzPR4eaBvakZi
    o2acfXIPaCZ+GeBNxaz5JKDTuteM/xavDjcb0bXs=
✓ DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=mailchimpapp.net;
    s=k1; t=1562918478; i=rortega=3D3Dasmusa.org@mailchimpapp.net;
    bh=z+cM1nqHlHrjpgwrD2iSbq3xmFeT/V05Zoa5X0w5TY8=;
    h=Subject:From:Reply-To:To:Date:Message-ID:List-ID:List-Unsubscribe:
    Content-Type:MIME-Version;
    b=iJriMQtloII7ciJrNISIOixgf2oWoCfaq/x02XnLq90zxEXXR8U0bgWa0LJU8wq3+
    00lgUstrU/Vd43B+umAAnKaRLoT3JjoExWh5B84cGnr+9MkcJWf+RB4QilG8GWtEgVL
    04W1o6pcuVupqSq0iCnrcuVI2L9hEwLXfnIqSMMQ=
✓ Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
    by mail22.suw13.rsgsv.net (Mailchimp) with ESMTTP id 45lQNZ5cXVzt6G
    for <xxxx@seznam.cz>; Fri, 12 Jul 2019 08:01:18 +0000 (GMT)
x-mcpf-jobid: mc.us7_22465175.1121249.5d283e46c424e.full_000002
Subject: =?utf-8?Q?New=20from=20microTalk=20for=2007=2F11=2F2019?=
From: =?utf-8?Q?American=20Society=20for=20Microbiology?= <rortega@asmusa.org>
Reply-To: =?utf-8?Q?American=20Society=20for=20Microbiology?= <rortega@asmusa.org>
To: <xxxx@seznam.cz>
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2019 08:01:17 +0000
Message-ID: <1772a0600a0b532d47343e0f9.0636065ea3.20190712080112.ac71646aa0.3ffee3b2@mail22.suw13.rsgsv.net>
X-Mailer: MailChimp Mailer - **CIDac71646aa00636065ea3**
X-Campaign: mailchimp1772a0600a0b532d47343e0f9.ac71646aa0
X-campaignid: mailchimp1772a0600a0b532d47343e0f9.ac71646aa0
```

# Concerns with Implementation



# DMARC Myth TWO



## It's a Silver Bullet

DMARC is not the cure for every cyber risk. It protects only one type of spoofing and should never be used alone. You need a layered defense with securing email, and DMARC is an important layer.   
DANE

# DMARC Myth THREE



## It's not good for privacy

With DMARC, you can view who is sending emails on your domain's behalf, thus protecting privacy by preventing hackers from using your domain to send suspicious messages within your organization and to your customers. DMARC reporting sets it above other secure email practices.

#GOTheDMARCWay



## DMARC Myth FOUR

“

**It's easy**

Starting the implementation of DMARC may be relatively simple, but the real work –and most important part– comes with analyzing reports and adjusting your policy level for



## DMARC Myth FIVE

“

**It's going to negatively impact my email**

DMARC actually improves the delivery rate of the email you send to customers and others.



# DMARC

## Myth



**It's only for large entities**

Every organization with a public-facing domain

# DMARC Myth **SEVEN**



**Antispam filters are enough**

While antispam software and email security gateways can protect against inbound phishing attempts, DMARC protects emails originating from your domain from being spoofed and used for phishing attacks.

#GOTheDMARCWay

# Concerns with Implementation

- Not enough resources
  - Implementation can be time consuming, especially if there are multiple sub-domains
  - Resources needed more for analysis of reports than implementation
- Mailing list and Mail forwarders
  - Breaks DMARC (as well as SPF and DKIM)
  - Solution – Authenticated Received Chain (ARC) – [arc-spec.org](https://arc-spec.org)

# Items to Plan for

- Understanding SPF, DKIM, and DMARC
- Access to DNS
- Understand the three policy levels of DMARC
- Does email server support DKIM?
- List of public domains used by organization
  - If you have subdomains - Consider creating a DMARC policy for sub-domains
- Potential Unknowns:
  - Is your organization using 3rd party vendors?
    - Do they support SPF and/or DKIM?
  - Mail systems that IT staff is unaware of
- DMARC report analysis
  - email address to send reports



# Additional Resources

- **DMARC.org** (<http://www.dmarc.org>) - Great source for DMARC information
- **GCA DMARC** - <https://dmarc.globalcyberalliance.org>
- **Community Forum** – <https://community.globalcyberalliance.org>
- **GCA YouTube Channel**
  - Webinars
  - Videos for GCA DMARC Setup Guide
  - DMARC Bootcamp

# Q&A

# Thank You!

## Next Session: May 12<sup>th</sup> – What are SPF and DKIM?

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